State transition and execution logic
Block and transaction validation, execution ordering, fee calculations, state commitment, replay behavior, precompiles, VM boundaries, and mismatches between specification and implementation.
L1, L2, client, and consensus security
Adversarial review of execution clients, consensus and validator logic, state transitions, bridges, networking, serialization, runtimes, and other chain-critical components across Rust, Go, C, and C++.
01 / Scope
Chain-critical vulnerabilities often live between layers: specification and implementation, validator and client, parser and state machine, bridge and finality source. The review follows those boundaries end to end.
Block and transaction validation, execution ordering, fee calculations, state commitment, replay behavior, precompiles, VM boundaries, and mismatches between specification and implementation.
Fork choice, finality assumptions, proposer and validator rules, evidence handling, timing, reorganization safety, slashing paths, and conditions that can split honest nodes.
Peer-to-peer message handling, WebSocket and RPC surfaces, framing, parsing, canonical encoding, resource exhaustion, malformed inputs, and trust boundaries between services.
Proof verification, message lifecycle, relayer assumptions, replay protection, finality dependencies, asset accounting, administrative controls, and recovery from partial failure.
02 / Method
The audit starts from safety and liveness invariants, then tests how malicious peers, malformed data, edge-case state, timing, reorganization, and implementation differences can violate them.
The review establishes which components can create or validate state, where implementations must agree, what roles are trusted, and which failures threaten safety, liveness, or funds.
Specifications, clients, libraries, and boundary formats are compared to find disagreements that can produce invalid state, consensus divergence, bypassed validation, or incompatible network behavior.
High-risk paths are tested with malformed, reordered, boundary, and resource-intensive inputs. Findings are validated against realistic attacker capabilities and deployment conditions.
Each issue connects root cause to chain-level impact, identifies the affected component and triggering conditions, and is rechecked after the engineering team implements a fix.
03 / Deliverables
Best fit
04 / Questions
A review can include execution or consensus clients, validator software, runtimes, virtual machines, state transition functions, RPC and peer-to-peer networking, bridges, proof verification, serialization libraries, relayers, and chain-specific system contracts. Scope is tailored to the system's security boundaries.
Public research includes C++, Rust, Go, Solidity, and Move, with additional work across mixed-language blockchain stacks. The key requirement is a clearly defined repository, specification, and deployment context for the components under review.
Yes. Pre-mainnet review is often the best time to test consensus assumptions, unsafe defaults, network boundaries, state migration, and recovery behavior before operational constraints make architectural fixes expensive.
Smart contract audits focus mainly on application-layer state and value flows. Blockchain security audits extend into consensus, execution, validator behavior, networking, serialization, storage, and cross-client agreement. Systems spanning both layers can be scoped as one coordinated review.
Yes when those surfaces are in scope. Resource exhaustion, malformed network inputs, unbounded processing, stuck state, recovery failures, peer behavior, and conditions that prevent progress can be as critical to a chain as direct asset theft.
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